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An Inquiry Into Indigenous Political Participation:
Implications for Tribal Sovereignty
David Wilkins
When we set out to examine the various forms and patterns of indigenous political
participation in the three polities they are connected to-tribal, state, and federal-we are
stepping into a most complicated subject matter. It is complicated in large part because
Indians are citizens of separate extra-constitutional nations whose members have only
gradually been incorporated in various ways by various federal policies and day to day
interactions with non-Indians. Tribal nations, of course, have never been constitutionally
incorporated and still retain their standing as separate political bodies not beholden to
either federal or state constitutions for their existence.
Each of these realities-Indians as citizens of continuing sovereign nations and
individual Indians as citizens of not only their tribes but also of the U.S. and the
states-exist simultaneously. If this were not complicated enough, since the late 1980s,
and largely as a result of Indian gaming, there now exists a situation where some tribal
governments, acting, they argue, in a sovereign capacity, are not only proactively
supporting state and federal office seekers (in addition to tribal office seekers) by making
significant financial contributions to American political campaigns (in addition to their
own tribal campaigns), but are also weighing in on issues-like the national tobacco
litigation-that seem unrelated to tribal affairs.
Tribal nations have reminded (lobbied) Washington policymakers since the
beginning of the republic about their contractual and moral obligations to protect treaty-
derived Indian rights, but gambling wealth is providing some tribes with opportunities to
employ skilled lobbyists, savvy public relations firms, and make large campaign
contributions "to win influence, make friends and crush opponents"1 in a manner
heretofore unknown.
For example, in New Mexico the various tribes contributed only $1100 to state
gubernatorial candidates in the 1986 elections. In the 1990 election the figure increased
to $7500. But in 1994, "clearly mobilized by the gaming issue, tribes donated $189,000
prior to election day and another $50,500 afterward."2 Other tribes have been even more
forthcoming with financial
contributions. The Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe of Connecticut in David Wilkins (Lumbee) is an associate I
1994 gave $500,000 to the professor of American Indian Studies at the
Democratic National Committee, University of Minnesota.
$100,000 to the Democratic Parties
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of California and New York, and $50,000 to Iowa's Democratic Party.'
The Pequot, in fact, who operate the Foxwoods Casino in Ledyard, Connecticut,
from 1988 to 1996 gave more in political contributions than any other gaming donor, a
total of $974,625. This exceeded the $569,250 donated by the Interface Group-Sands
Hotel; the $554,000 of the Mirage Resorts; and the $470,905 given by Bally
Entertainment.4
And in California in 1998, eighty-eight tribes, representing ninety-six percent of
California's reservation-based Indians, fought for and secured with a lot of non-tribal
support, passage of an initiative, Proposition 5, that requires that the tribes be granted a
gaming compact, upon request, to continue their existing gaming activities on their
reservation lands. This was the most expensive state initiative ever, with the pro and anti
Proposition 5 sides having raised nearly $86 million. The tribes raised more than two-
thirds of that amount. Although this initiative was declared invalid by the Supreme Court
of California in August of 1999, the manner in which it was implemented showed that
tribes with sufficient revenues could have a significant role in state public policy.
The California tribes had previously been deeply involved in state gubernatorial
campaigns in 1994. In 1994 gaming tribes contributed more than $800,000 to
unsuccessful campaigns to unseat Governor Pete Wilson and Attorney General Dan
Lungren. The California Indian Nation Political Action Committee contributed almost
$1.1 million to California candidates and political parties between 1994 and 1996.'
On the national level, but also centered around Indian gaming and campaign
finances, was U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno's probe of Secretary of Interior Bruce
Babbitt's alleged involvement in the 1995 rejection of an application by Ojibwe Indians
to build a casino off their reservation at a failing dog track in Wisconsin. "The fiercest
opposition to this project came from other tribes in Minnesota whose established casinos
would face competition from the new one. Those tribes hired legal counsel with strong
connections to the Democratic party and White House. Their lawyers got the ear of the
president and close aides. Outcome! A rejected application and, soon after, a nearly
$300,000 donation to the Democrats' reelection effort for Clinton-Gore."6 Clearly, Indian
gaming has wrought a revolutionary shift in the involvement of some tribes in state and
federal politics on an unprecedented scale.
It is a shift that has the potential to dramatically redefine the essence of tribal
sovereignty and the historic nation to nation relationship originally articulated in treaties
and acknowledged in the U.S. Constitution. For if tribal governments and their multi-
layered citizens are so actively engaged in non-Indian politics, can tribes still legitimately
assert that they are in fact extra-constitutional sovereigns whose treaty and trust based
rights originally affirmed their distinctive and independent sovereignty?7
The issue of indigenous political participation in non-Indian politics is of
tremendous interest to those intent on invigorating tribal sovereignty not solely because
greater participation necessarily produces better policy decisions, but because of the
developmental value of participation in educating and socializing people which enhances
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both the meaning of their lives and the value of their relationship to one another and their
respective indigenous community.
In the remainder of this paper we want to examine the attitudes and some of the
actual ways Indians engage in politics. Our emphasis, however, will primarily be on
indigenous participation in non-tribal political affairs (e.g., voting, ideology, partisanship,
electoral politics, and endorsements) in large part because there is such scant social
science research available on Indian participation in Indian political systems.
I hasten to add that there is only a little more research on Indian participation in
non-Indian politics, but there is at least enough research for us to raise some substantive
questions even if we cannot provide any definitive answers. I begin with some discussion
about why there is such a paucity in political science literature (which should logically
address all political sovereigns in the U.S., but until recently almost completely ignored
indigenous politics) and then turn my attention to the concept of patriotism and suffrage.
I then move to examine issues of ideology, partisanship, interest group activity by Indians,
and finally indigenous activism.
I. A NEVER ENDING QUEST FOR JUSTICE
There is, unfortunately, an astounding lack of research by political scientists about
Indian peoples as political entities situated in a sovereign to sovereign relationship with
the U.S. and state governments. This paucity is palpable considering the preexisting
nature of indigenous governments and the wealth of political issues and question that are
an inherent part of the tribal situation singly and intergovenmentally-constitutional
origins, political development and underdevelopment, the unique body of federal Indian
law and policy, social movement organizations, legislative party dynamics, and the roles
of Congress, the President, the Courts, and the bureaucracy in formulating, implementing,
or stymieing Indian policy, to name but a few.
Part of the reason for the reluctance or refusal of political scientists to examine
indigenous political participation rests on the fact that politically tribal nations,
generally-although this is changing for some tribes-do not consider themselves to be part
of the pluralistic mosaic that is predominant in political science literature. Tribes perceive
of themselves not only as pre-constitutional entities, but more importantly, as extra-
constitutional polities. For example, in comparison to African Americans one
commentator put it thus:
The overriding goal of the black civil rights movement was to achieve individual
equality and individual rights as promised within the philosophy of liberalism.
Native American leaders, on the other hand, have historically demanded
recognition of their tribal [national] rights as guaranteed by treaties, executive
agreements, and congressional statutes."
The noted Indian scholar and activist, Vine Deloria, Jr., says it more pithily when
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he states that the primary difference between blacks and Indians is that blacks are
pursuing equality of acceptance and equal opportunity in American society while Indians
pursue justice. By "justice," Deloria means the Indians' right to maintain their sovereign
integrity and to rest assured that their treaty and trust rights will be protected. These goals
are evidenced in the tribe's focus on tribal sovereignty and maintaining and enhancing
their separate land base-goals dissimilar from America's other racial and ethnic minority
groups.
II. INDIANS AS PATRIOTS: BUT OF WHICH NATION?
Because of the inherent tension between the doctrine of tribal sovereignty and the
federal government's historical effort to assimilate native peoples, Indians have developed
a complicated set of attitudes and values about their relationship to their nation and to the
U.S., that affects their involvement or lack of involvement in tribal, state, and federal
elections. Diane Duffy, in some preliminary research on the subject of Indian patriotism
based on interview data arrived at the following diverse categories of patriotism:
1. Indigenous (traditional) patriotism: the tribal nation is the sole
allegiance for Native Americans. This allegiance is expressed in positive
Indian, not anti-white language.
2. Measured-separatism patriotism: primary allegiance is to the tribe, but
also there is some (measured) support for the U.S. and willingness to
"serve" as "allies" with the U.S. in the armed services in battles with
foreign nations.
3. Anti-American patriotism: against the U.S. (rather than for their tribe).
Adherents would under no circumstances "serve" in the U.S. military
because they would consider it treasonous.
4. Environmental patriotism: similar to the first category, but allegiance
is explicitly tied to all of the creation and not simply human society.
5. Assimilative patriotism: the U.S. is perceived as the superior power and
the tribal nation is subordinate.
6. Co-optive or colonized patriotism: adherents refuse to conceive of a
separate tribal political consciousness that has merit and is deserving of
allegiance.
7. Apatriotic: believe that patriotism is an irrelevant concept for Native
Americans.9
An example of Category One is found in a 1998 speech by Chief Irving Powless,
Jr., of the Onondaga Nation. After questioning the validity of the 1924 General Indian
Citizenship Act, Powless stated that "the Haudenosaunee [also known as the Iroquois
Confederacy] have never accepted this law. We do not consider ourselves as citizens of
the United States. This law is a violation of the treaties that we signed that prove that we
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are sovereign. Because we are a sovereign people the United States can not make us
citizens of their nation against our will .... I have never voted in any election of the
United States nor do I intend to vote in any coming elections. Most of our people have
never voted in your elections. A few have, but there are not that many who have moved
in that direction."'0
What Powless did not address, because that was not his focus, was the fact that
as a Chief he is expected to be active in Onondaga and the Iroquois Confederacy's
political affairs and he is compelled by the Iroquois Great Law to cast votes in matters
affecting his own nation or those of the Confederacy. But Powless's views represent only
one view of indigenous political reality, albeit one rooted in indigenous nationality.
III. INDIANS AS AMERICAN VOTERS: AMBIVALENCY AMONG THE
ASSIMILATORS
As Duffy's categories show, the subject of patriotism is far more complicated than
many might imagine. In fact, it appears that a steady number of Indians express support
for tribal sovereignty, but an increasing number believe that in order to protect these
sovereign rights they must participate in the American political process, whether as
voters, giving endorsements, engaging in volunteer campaign work for non-Indian office
seekers, et cetera. Such seemingly pragmatic political decisions were evident in
September 1998 at a large conference that was sponsored by several Arizona tribes and
Indian organizations like the Arizona Indian Gaming Association. The conference was
held on the Gila River Reservation in central Arizona. It had as its theme "Celebrate Fifty
Years of Arizona Indian Citizens Right to Vote," a focused reference to a 1948 Arizona
Supreme Court decision, Harrison v. Laveen," that conceded to Indians in the state the
right to vote in state and federal elections.
The conference brought together candidates for various state and federal elections
and from both political parties to meet with and discuss campaign ideas with several
hundred Indians and tribal leaders from many of the state's twenty-one reservations. A
number of issues were addressed including taxation, education, appropriations, Indian
child welfare, senior citizens, environmental issues and especially Indian gaming. But it
was gaming which topped the list of items of concern. For example, Proposition 304, that
would have amended state law to continue the Arizona State Lottery until July 1, 2003,
was vigorously discussed. Indian attendees were strongly encouraged to vote in general,
and specifically to support of Prop. 304 out of fear that if the Arizona Lottery was
terminated this might lead to an effort by the state to end comparable Indian gaming
operations. It is the voting behavior of individual Indians which across time has received
some scholarly attention since Congress extended the franchise to Indians in 1924.
Of those Indians who have opted to vote in county, municipal, state, or federal
elections, their right to exercise this most fundamental of democratic liberties came later
than it did for any other large group in the U.S. On the one hand, this should not be
surprising, since federal and state lawmakers have been wholly inconsistent in defining
736 V
Indigenous Political Participation
the meanings of citizenship for a multitude of groups, many of whom happened to be non-
white or non-male-women; Africans brought enslaved and their descendants; other
categories of involuntary immigrants (people of Mexican birth or identity, who "became"
American when the U.S. acquired Texas, New Mexico, and other territory after the
Mexican War); "non-citizen nationals" who lived in possessions that never became states
Filipinos from 1898-1946, Puerto Ricans between 1900-1917, Virgin Islanders between
1917-1927, persons born in American Samoa now; voluntary immigrants from Asia and
elsewhere, who for many years were ineligible for naturalization; refugees who can never
return to their homelands; and finally, "refugees uprooted by disruptions in which they
have reason to believe the United States was complicit, for example, Vietnamese 'boat
people'."2
On the other hand, the denial of the franchise to Indians seems convoluted because
since at least the early 1800s, though sporadically, many federal policymakers have sought
by various assimilative measures to bring Indians, whether willingly or not, into the
American body politic. As Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas J. Morgan put it in
1891, in assessing the steps the government was using to bring the Indians to a "higher
state of civilization":
The allotment of land, the restriction of the power of alienation, the compulsory
education of their children, the destruction of the tribal organization, the
bestowment of citizenship, the repression of heathenish and hurtful practices, the
suppression of outbreaks, and punishment for lawlessness are among the things
which belong unmistakably to the prerogatives of the National Government. 3
In short, while most racial/ethnic groups and women faced aforced exclusion from
the American social contract, Indians, since the 1880s, faced a forced inclusion into the
American polity. However, it was an inconsistent and ambivalent inclusion at best. Most
of the actions by federal policymakers from the 1800s to the 1970s were aimed at
"Americanizing" and "civilizing" Indians. However, there were occasionally opposite
actions by lawmakers and justices that insisted that Indians were "alien peoples" or were
not quite up to or deserving of complete American citizenship.
Thus, with the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment ("the right of citizens of the
U.S. to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the U.S. or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude") 4 and when Congress enacted the 1924 General
Indian Citizenship Act, which read in part that "all non-citizen Indians born within the
territorial limits of the United States ... are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States,""5 it would appear that the matter of whether Indians were entitled to vote in U.S.
elections was solved. Such was not the case, however.
First, tribal nations continued to exist as separate sovereign entities since the
citizenship act only applied to individual Indians, not Indian nations. Second, some
states, which establish voting eligibility criteria, and being well aware of the ongoing
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vitality of tribal sovereignty as evidenced by a) treaty rights which exempt tribal lands and
their members from most state regulations and taxation; and b) state constitutional
disclaimer clauses which detail that state governments cannot extend their jurisdiction or
taxing authority over Indians or tribes inside Indian Country who hold lands in trust
status, denied the franchise to those Indians who wanted to vote. While black Americans
faced poll taxes, literacy requirements, gerrymandering, violence, at-large elections, and
other devices which denied them the franchise, Indians, because of their extra-
constitutional political status faced some similar discriminatory measures but also
encountered a variety of unique obstacles placed before them by state officials.
McCool found that states have devised a number of strategies to keep Indians from
voting. He grouped them in three categories: 1) constitutional ambiguity, 2) political and
economic factors, and 3) cultural and racial discrimination. 6 Evidence of constitutional
ambiguity is found in several states-Idaho, New Mexico, and Washington-which denied
Indians the vote because of a specific provision in their constitutions regarding "Indians
not taxed." Such Indians, according to the Idaho Constitution, could not vote or serve as
aj uror if they were considered to be non-taxable because they had not "severed their tribal
relations and adopted the habits of civilization."'
' 7
In Arizona, the franchise was denied to Indians until 1948 (Harrison v. Laveen)
on the specious grounds that they were "under guardianship." The pertinent clause in the
Arizona Constitution read that "no person under guardianship, non compos mentis, or
insane shall be qualified to vote in any election. .. "
Political and economic factors have also been used to deny Indians the right to
vote. In Elk v. Wilkins, the Supreme Court held that Indians held allegiance to their own
"alien nations" and could thus not be considered loyal Americans.' 8 In Utah, Indians on
reservations were, until 1956, denied voting privileges under an opinion of the State
Attorney General which stated that they were not "residents" of Utah. The Utah Supreme
Court in Allen v. Merrell upheld the Attorney General's opinion by declaring that by
"allowing them [Indians] to vote might place substantial control of the county government
and the expenditures of its funds in a group of citizens who, as a class, had an extremely
limited interest in its function and very little responsibility in providing the financial
support thereof."' 9
Finally, outright cultural and racial discrimination was sometimes used to deny
Indians the right to vote. For example, as late as 1937 the State of Colorado denied
Indians voting rights claiming that they were not yet citizens. This action directly flouted
the General Indian Citizenship Act of 1924. As the Attorney General said in a letter to
Superintendent Watson of the Ute Agency, on November 24, 1936, "it is our opinion that
until Congress enfranchises the Indian, he will not have the right to vote.""0
And the state of North Carolina, in action comparable to what blacks experienced,
discriminated against Indians under color of a provision of the state election law which
declared that a person desiring to register must be able to read and write any section of the
U.S. Constitution in the English language and must show this "to the satisfaction of the
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registrar." As the Cherokee Indian Superintendent stated: "We have had Indian graduates
of Carlisle, Haskell and other schools in instances much better educated than the registrar
himself, turned down because they did not read or write to his satisfaction."'"
While states no longer overtly disallow Indians the right to vote, and Congress has
stepped in with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (and amendments) which
prohibits tests or other devices to disenfranchise racial minorities, the problem of voter
dilution-"the impairment of the equal opportunity of minority voters to participate in the
political process and to elect candidates of their choice"-continues to be a real concern
for some tribes and their citizens. Annexation, at-large representation, and
gerrymandering are three diluting devices states have used to weaken the vote of minority
groups, including Indian nations.
For Indian peoples, particularly in areas where the Indian population is a majority
or near majority, like Northern Arizona, parts of New Mexico and Utah, and sections of
South Dakota, vote dilution has been an ongoing struggle. In Arizona, state lawmakers
in the early 1980s attempted to create an all-Indian county, what one state senator called
the "Arizona Apartheid Act.
22
In Wyoming in 1986, Big Horn County was found guilty in Windy Boy v. County
of Big Horn,23 of "official acts of discrimination [that] have interfered with the rights of
Indian citizens to register and vote" in the form of an at-large scheme that denied the
plaintiffs' right to participate in elections and to elect representatives of their choice to
county and school board offices.2 4 And as recently as 1996, advocates for American
Indians in Montana filed a lawsuit in which they alleged that the state's new legislative
districts diluted Indians' voting power.25
IV. INDIANS, IDEOLOGY, AND PARTISANSHIP
As noted earlier, there is such a scanty research record that it is impossible to
arrive at anything more than general impressions of Indian political ideology or political
behavior patterns in American elections. There is, unfortunately, even less data available
on how Indians participate in tribal elections.26 It is still worthwhile, however, to briefly
discuss the available findings with the caveat that much more work must be done before
we can accurately discuss these important topics.
One recent study on Indian party identification indicates that on the national level
Indians, as individuals, do engage in some partisan politics and that their "party
identification and political orientation, have been remarkably stable (i. e., there have been
no statistically significant changes over the twenty year period from 1974 to 1994). ' '27 In
fact, more Indians see themselves as Democrats, although a sizable number identify as
independent, with Republicans trailing badly. And interestingly, as for orientation, more
Indians identify as moderate and conservative than as liberal. This might explain how the
lone Indian congressman, Ben Nighthorse Campbell (Republican from Colorado) made
the switch from the Democratic to the Republican party with relative ease during the
104th Congress. Campbell asserts that the core Republican principles of promoting less
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federal government control and championing the free enterprise system are in keeping
with tribal philosophies.
This information focuses on aggregate data and does not reflect the party
identification or political orientation of the membership of specific tribes, which will
surely differ. For example, a study of partisan preferences for Indian voters in Wisconsin,
Minnesota, and North and South Dakota, from 1982 to 1992, indicates a strong preference
for Democrats.28 Even more impressively, Pueblo Indians in 1994 voted overwhelmingly
democratic-eighty-five percent, "a one-sided level of support which parallels the strongest
Democratic voting constituencies in the United States."29
Navajos, on the other hand, over the last forty years or so "have shifted from
Republican to Democratic and, during the Reagan years, slightly back to the Republican,
at least in national elections., 30 At the state and local level, however, Navajos exhibit a
strong Democratic preference. A somewhat dated study of Navajo political attitudes and
behavior conducted by the National Indian Youth Council in 1984 found that sixty-seven
percent of the Navajos identified as Democrats, eleven percent as Republicans, and eleven
percent as Independents. Some ten percent had no party preference. Of those identifying
as Democrat, fifty-one percent said they were strong Democrats, compared to only
twenty-one percent who identified themselves as strong Republicans.
Besides tribal-specific differences, there is recent evidence of generational
differences as well. A survey developed by the Solidarity Foundation, an Indian research
group, was sent to over 1000 Indian high school and college age students. Their
responses were then compared with an equivalent sample of Indians over the age of thirty-
five. The preliminary results indicate that "the coming generation is more inclined and
better equipped than ever to assume leadership positions in their communities. The
survey found that the Indian youth of today are more aware, more involved, and more
concerned about Native issues than ever before.'
As for partisan identification, the survey's results show that Indian youth are
moving away from clear partisan affiliation, preferring to identify as independent or even
as non-affiliated. When asked the question, "With which political party do you most
closely associate your own belief and values?" only thirty-seven percent of those under
twenty-six years of age replied that they identified as Democrat. This compared with
fifty-four percent of those over twenty-six who identified as Democrat.
The survey does reveal, however, that the Republican party is still not drawing
Indians to its fold. Less than five percent of the respondents identified as Republican.
Independents, however, captured the allegiance of seventeen percent of the youth. And
while less than thirty percent of the adults did not affiliate with a particular party, over
forty percent of the youth were unaffiliated. In fact, nearly fifty percent of young Indian
males (48.3 percent) said they were not attached to any political party.
An increasing number of tribes and their members, regardless of their views on
partisanship, apparently believe that state, county and local politics are becoming
increasingly important and in the period from 1997-1999 twenty-eight American Indians
740 V
Indigenous Political Participation
and Alaska Natives were serving in eight state legislatures, strategically balancing their
citizenship in their tribal nation with service to the state.
V. INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITY AND INDIAN NATIONS
McClain and Stewart note that "interest groups that focus on issues of importance
to blacks, Latinos, Asians, and American Indians have been essential to the progress made
toward the incorporation of these groups into the American political system."32 While this
statement is broadly accurate for most of the groups, the situation of indigenous nations
is much more complicated because of their pre- and extra-constitutional status. For much
of this nation's history, the general thrust of most racial and ethnic groups and their
members has been to seek inclusion (to become constitutionally incorporated) into the
American social contract; by contrast, the general thrust of most indigenous nations and
their citizens (notwithstanding their American citizenship) has been to retain their
political and cultural exclusion from absorption or incorporation in the American polity.
Of course, as we have already described, the forces of American
colonialism-including the imposition of western religious beliefs, western values, and
western property arrangements-have unabashedly sought to incorporate Indian lands,
resources, and citizens, while sometimes exhibiting a measure of respect for Indian treaty
rights, attempts to restore some tribal lands, and provide some protection for Indian
religious beliefs and sacred sites.
These forces, combined with individual Indian free will, high out marriage rates,
the urbanization of Indians, and the near hegemony of the media and the corporate world,
contribute mightily to drawing a portrait of indigenous America that is more diversified
than ever before. Notwithstanding this increasing and seemingly inexorable
diversification among indigenous peoples, it is still apparent that maintaining and
reaffirming Indian political, economic, and cultural identity is a central issue for most
indigenous peoples most of the time. And this is true regardless of whether they are
reservation-based or urban based, full-blood or mixed blood, recognized or non-
recognized, exercising treaty rights or treaty-less, practicing traditional spiritual
ceremonies or acting as members of Christian sects. For example, in the Solidarity
Foundation survey of Indian youth, more than ninety-six percent of those surveyed
"identified themselves with their Indian nation, and more than forty percent identified
themselves solely with their Indian nationality. Only a little more than half of the youth
identified themselves as American citizens. 33
Indians have politically organized along four levels in pursuing their various goals:
1) intra-tribal; 2) tribal; 3) inter-tribal coalitions and alliances; and as 4) alliances of
like-minded individuals.3 4 This organization has occurred because individuals or tribes
share common political, economic, or cultural goals and seek to influence public policy
decisions that affect them and their constituents.
Wilkins
A. Intra-tribal
This type of political mobilization occurs when segments of specific tribes,
frustrated by the direction of tribal leadership, organize to challenge or confront the
existing tribal power structure. For example, within the Navajo Nation a number of intra-
tribal interest groups have been formed over the years, bent on lobbying or pressing their
government to create, or block, policies deemed important to the group's membership.
A sample of these includes: Navajo Returned Students Association (organized in the
early 1900s to represent the needs and interests of Indian students educated at off-
reservation boarding schools); Navajo Native American Church (organized in the 1940s
to advocate for the rights of Church members during a time when the use of peyote-the
sacrament of the Church's members-was banned by the tribal government); Dind
Coalition (Navajo individuals opposed to coal gasification in the 1970s) Dind C.A.R.E.
(Citizens Against Ruining the Environment) (organized in 1988 to oppose the dumping
of toxic waste and other environmental degradation of Navajo lands).
B. Tribal
This type of mobilization involves organization and action by members of a single
tribe in pursuit of tribal-specific goals. To continue with our Navajo example, beginning
in the 1870s and continuing through the early 1900s, the Navajo Nation's leadership
successfully lobbied the federal government to have sizable chunks of land added to their
existing reservation boundaries during an era when explicit federal policy was aimed at
dissolving reservations via the General Allotment policy begun in 1887 and continuing
through the early 1930s.35
C. Inter-tribal coalitions and alliances
This type of political mobilization involves action by the members of multiple
tribes acting on the basis of tribal affiliation in pursuit of common political or economic
goals. Historical examples would include the following. First, the temporary coalition
of the various Pueblo Nations in 1680 to drive out the Spanish invaders. Second, the
efforts of Pontiac, an Ottawa Indian, in the late 18th Century to create an inter-tribal
league to fend off the English invaders. Third, in the early 19th Century Tecumseh and
the Shawnee Prophet, Tenskwatawa, formed an alliance of a number of Northeastern and
Midwestern tribes to try to halt and attempt to reverse the flow of Euro-Americans into
their territories. Fourth, attempts by the Five Civilized Tribes from 1846 to 1886 to get
the U.S. to provide their nations some kind of official status within the American
constitutional framework. This culminated in a failed attempt in the late 1800s by the
tribes to organize a constitutionally-incorporated Indian state, the State of Sequoyah.36
Contemporary examples of inter-tribal coalitions and alliances, both regional and
national (some now defunct) include the following: the United South and Eastern Tribes,
Inc. (USET); the Great Lakes Intertribal Council; the Intertribal Council of California; the
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Alaska Native Brotherhood and Sisterhood (ANB/S); Coalition of Eastern Native
Americans (CENA) (defunct); the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission (NIFC); the
Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission; the National Congress of American Indians
(NCAI); the National Tribal Chairmen's Association (NTCA) (defunct); and the Council
of Energy Resource Tribes (CERT).
D. Alliances of like-minded Indian individuals (also known as pan-Indian
or supratribal organizations)
This type of political mobilization involves organizations and action "by
individual Indians on the basis of Indianness and in pursuit of pan-Indian goals."37 The
very idea of "American Indians," a historical misnomer, now encapsulates a distinctly
"Indian" identity, that is distinct from one's tribal identity. Indeed, as Cornell describes
it, "increasingly for large numbers of Indians, Indian identity-as distinct from tribal
identity-has become a conscious and important basis of action and thought in its own
right. A host of 'American Indian' and 'Native American' organizations testify to its
salience, as do the numerous cooperative political efforts by Indian groups and
organizations on behalf of both tribal and supratribal interests."38
Pan-Indian or supratribal interest groups generally espouse a political identity
rather than a cultural identity and, importantly, are the result of Indian/non-Indian
interaction. This is evident in the facts behind the first such national Indian organization,
the Society of American Indians (SAI), established in 1911. This organization, for
example, was triggered by the experiences of Indian graduates of the federal government's
boarding schools started in the later half of the 19th Century. At these schools, the
explicit goal was the assimilation of Indians from many tribes by forced regimentation
and inculcation of western religious, property, and social values and norms.39
In its form, leadership, and aim, SAI was similar to the white reform organizations
and the developing black movements of the Progressive Era. Its most dynamic leaders
were largely middle class, well educated, "conscious of their attainments and
responsibilities to those less favoured than themselves and proud of their respectability." 40
Generally, the objectives of the group were to encourage Indian leadership, promote self-
help, and, to foster the assimilation of Indians while encouraging them to exhibit pride in
their race.
SAI was followed by the National Council of American Indians in the 1920s and
1930s. This organization, founded by two former Society members, Gertrude and R. T.
Bonnin, included many other former SAI members as well. Although purporting to be
a body that represented many tribes, in actuality it was a small, struggling group held
together by the faith and hard work of the Bonnin's. It was interested in helping Indians
secure the right to vote, assisting individual Indians with other grievances, and worked
with some tribal nations. In fact, the letterhead of the Council stationery proclaimed its
goal: "Help Indians Help Themselves in Protecting Their Rights and Properties."' The
organization produced a newsletter and worked closely with non-Indian reform
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organizations. Gertrude Bonnin knew and worked closely with John Collier in the 1920s
and 1930s. But facing a plethora of issues, including lack of tribal support and lacking
adequate resources, it folded in the mid-1930s.
VI. INDIAN INTERESTS VEER TOWARD "RED POWER"
A confluence of events in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, led to a welter of pan-
Indian interest groups operating on a number of levels: regional, national, and
international. The confluence entailed 1) the federal government's termination and
relocation programs, 2) the Civil Rights movement, 3) the activism of university-trained
Indian lawyers and professors, 4) the resurgence of pow-wows and other Indian cultural
expressions that cut across tribal lines; and 5) the explosion of a national Indian news
media. The outgrowth of this conjuncture was a new generation of Indians who organized
a variety of organizations aimed not at supporting restorative or integrative goals, but at
transforming and segregating their constituencies.
Indigenous activism and resistance to colonizing European states and their
derivative settler-states has, of course, been ongoing since their homelands were first
invaded half a millennium ago. However, in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, and
continuing into the late 1970s, the ad hoc and unpredicted merger of historic events (e.g.,
civil rights concerns, new social consciousness), social-economic disparities, coalitions
between urban and reservation native peoples, key indigenous and non-indigenous
personalities, environmental concerns, good timing, and others, fueled a unique surge of
indigenous activism that enabled indigenous peoples to, in some cases, begin to (re)gain
access to lands, (re)claim some measure of ownership of natural resources, (re)assert their
distinctive treaty rights, and partake of other benefits and privileges heretofore under
protected or in some cases flatly denied to them by their host state. Equally important,
this activism fueled a "more open and confident sense of identity among people of Indian
descent," whether urban or reservation based.42
This section of the paper examines this unfolding of indigenous activism in the
United States by examining the key actors, events, and processes that made it happen. As
we shall see, the Indian activist movement of this era was not fundamentally a part of the
other racial or ethnic social movements (e.g., Black civil rights), although it certainly
benefitted from those movements by adopting some of the symbols and other aspects of
those movements and by taking advantage of the changed political atmosphere to push
through their agenda. In a greater sense, then, "the Indian movement is a continuing
resistance which has its basic roots in the Indian experience of the last [five] centuries. '
Most Indian resistance from the first decades of the 1900s up to the explosion of
activities in the 1960s occurred at the individual tribal level and tended to be focused on
specific issues that threatened tribal lands, resources, or civil or treaty rights-Navajo
livestock reduction in the 1930s and 1940s, Iroquois' challenges to dams and other water
projects (i. e., Senecas and the Kinzua Dam controversy in the 1940s and 1950s, Mohawks
and Tuscaroras over the St. Lawrence Seaway in the 1950s and 1960s), the Lumbee
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routing the Ku Klux Klan in 1957, the fishing rights struggles of the Pacific Northwest
tribes in the 1950s and 1960s."
In fact, the success of the fish-in movements involving tribes in Washington State
(eventually the Indians judicially secured the right to one-half of the harvestable salmon
under their 1855 treaty) proved an outstanding training ground for Indian rights activists.
"The fish-ins taught Indian activists two important goals: first, that the redress of tribal
grievances could be pursued by an alliance of tribal and supratribal organizations and
collective action, and, second, that attracting the attention of national media was crucial
to obtaining judicial and legislative review."45
The first lesson has already been touched upon above. The second, however, the
role of the media, is important and warrants some attention. During the fish-ins tribal and
organizational leaders reached out and involved entertainment figures like the
comedian/activist, Dick Gregory, and the movie actor, Marlon Brando, to help publicize
their situation. When the American Indian Movement (AIM) was born in 1968, its
leadership early on sought to manipulate the media to their advantage. While generally
successful at this, this tactic had serious costs. AIM's leadership "sometimes traded on
America's fascination with the image of the male warrior" because AIM was "still
bounded by their own vision of history and the biases of reporters and the public."'
A recent study's findings that focused on the National Broadcasting Company's
(NBC) news coverage of AIM from 1968 to 1979 bears this out.47 The author culled from
the data five "media frames," or ways in which the media depicted AIM's goals and
actions: militant, stereotype, treaty rights, civil rights, and factionalism. He found that
ninety-eight percent of NBC's evening coverage of AIM's activities were couched in
either the militant or stereotype frames, although AIM's leadership sought to emphasize
treaty rights and civil rights issues. In fact, "the Militant frame clearly dominated the
nightly news segments. The operationalized Militant frame included any segment that
labeled Indian protesters as 'militant' or where the focus was on violence and the
breakdown of law and order." ' The study concludes by describing the "dysfunctions of
media attention" which presents "a distorted and incomplete picture of a movement's
message and goals."'49
The term "Red Power" has been attributed to Vine Deloria, Jr., then the Executive
Director of the National Congress of American Indians, in a 1966 speech at the
organization's annual meeting. Deloria, a Standing Rock Sioux, was one of a new breed
of Indians committed to transforming the state of Indian/White relations by attempting to
bridge the gulf between more radical organizations like the NIYC and established ones
like the NCAI. He also believed that alliances between the various tribal and pan-Indian
organizations, urban and reservation, and Eastern and Western tribes, would prove
beneficial to Indian interests.50
The earlier discussed confluence of events like the rise of tribal-based civil and
treaty rights activism, the birth of national Indian organizations, rapid growth of the urban
Indian population, the printing of powerful books like Deloria's Custer Diedfor Your Sins
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in 1969, the influx of federal funds available to Indians as poverty-stricken communities
under the War on Poverty programs, and the broader civil rights developments, all fueled
a tribal and national indigenous political consciousness that led to a surge of Indian
protest activity by the end of the 1960s.
A turning point in the level of activity was the 1969 takeover and occupation of
Alcatraz Island near San Francisco. This event, for many commentators, 5' represents the
launching pad of the Red Power period, which runs from 1969 to 1978. There was a
noticeable shift from tribally-based protests to larger nationally organized events, spurred
"by Indians from a variety of tribes sharing a common interest in Indian and tribal rights
broadly conceived .... , In fact, the activist political strategy focused on calling the
federal government to account for its past and present misdeeds and omissions. And as
Deloria showed, "treaty rights rather than eligibility and need became the criteria for
protest and the idea was to play directly on whatever reservoir of cumulative guild lay
hidden in the public psyche."iD
The underlying goals of the Indians of Alcatraz were to make the American public
aware of the reality of their situation and by extension that of Indians throughout the land,
and to assert the need for Indian self-determination. 4 The occupation certainly succeeded
in realizing these goals as the ensuing flurry of events, laws, court decisions, and policies
attests. Some seventy-four Indian occupations and demonstrations followed in Alcatraz's
wake. These included the Trail of Broken Treaties and the BIA Takeover in 1972,
Wounded Knee II in 1973, takeover of the Alexian Brothers Roman Catholic novitiate in
Gresham, Wisconsin by the Menominee Warrior Society with AIM support, the Longest
Walk from San Francisco to Washington, D.C., that symbolized the forced removal of
Indians and to protest pending congressional bills aimed at terminating or dramatically
reducing Indian treaty rights.
Two interesting observations can be made of this tumultuous period. First, the
traditional religious dimension of Indian life, that had previously caused divisiveness and
fragmentation among Indian organizations (Indian traditionalist vs. Indian Christians),
actually was the most important aspect of many of these occupations and demonstrations
"and signaled that despite several centuries of assimilationist thrust tribal identity was still
a major factor."55 Second, and related to the first, the Red Power movement helped
educate and alter the consciousness of many Americans about Indians. The movement
and its supporters stressed the fact that "Indians have cultures, traditions, history, and
communities that they want to preserve-but that they also want equal justice, economic
opportunity, access to education, and more accurate portrayal of Indians in the media and
in history books. 56
In effect, the indigenous political response posed a direct challenge to the existing
Indian/white relationship in three respects: 1) their response circumvented the
administrative structure of that relationship; 2) their response assaulted that structure
itself; and 3) their response was a rebuke to the dominant assimilationist policy that the
U.S. had followed for most of the years of Indian/white relations."
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The U.S. response to all this indigenous activity was, as one would expect,
variegated. Generally, however, most of the nation's responses to Indian activism can be
grouped in four categories: 1) efforts to suppress and discredit the most radical elements
of Indian resistance by engaging in a systematic campaign of surveillance, infiltration, and
indictment (e.g., the government's COINTELPRO operation against AIM and its
leadership); 2) congressional and public responses in the form of anti-Indian activity and
legislation aimed at offsetting or striking against the Indians political and legal gains that
at times upset white land titles or hunting and fishing industries (e.g., the introduction of
bills to abrogate Indian treaties and weaken Indian rights in general); 3) symbolic reform
in response to particular Indian demands (e.g., establishment of the American Indian
Policy Review Commission in 1975, increasing Indian staffing at the BIA, and creating
a new position, the Assistant- Secretary of Indian Affairs to replace the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs position); and 4) a number of substantive measures to accommodate Indian
concerns and demands (e.g., return of some traditional lands to certain tribes, the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, the Indian Religious Freedom
Act of 1978, et cetera).58
But overall, one could make a plausible argument that the 1970s entailed a
significant turning point in the political fortunes of American Indian nations since "major
legislation enacted after 1968 has, for the most part, incorporated the policy goals and
preferences of Indian constituencies and groups." 59 Along with the important role that
Indian activism/radicalism played in creating a more favorable climate for the improved
situation of Indians in the 1970s, other factors were also involved. First, the emergence
of more liberal social attitudes toward all minority groups. Second, the use and
manipulation by Indians and their advocates of the mass media to dramatize the political
and economic difficulties confronting Indians. Third, improved federal financial support
in the form of War on Poverty and Great Society programs and the educational
opportunities these dollars made available to Indians for college, graduate, and law
schools. Fourth, presidential policy initiatives-Nixon's support of Indian self-
determination. Fifth, congressional interest in righting historic wrongs or enacting
legislation to improve the situation for Indians. Finally, the ability of Indians to represent
their own interests or secure effective help.'
Ronald Reagan's election, however, in 1980, foretold less heady days for Indian
rights because of massive cutbacks in federal funding for tribes; cutbacks which,
coincidentally, opened the door for Indian gaming operations to commence and for a new
type of political participation in American politics to begin. Along with the economic
downturn, but before the economic upturn for some tribes, there was also a resurgence of
states' rights activism and a dramatic redefinition of federalism which meant that tribes
and states would again butt heads over many issues. The revival of the 18th Century
concept of dual federalism fueled by the Rehnquist Court and the Gingrich led Congress
enabled states to gain the upper hand in many of their battles with tribal nations.
Reagan's appointment of many conservatives to the federal courts signaled that the federal
V 747
Wilkins
judiciary, which for a brief period had been a bastion of liberalism where tribes had been
able to secure some fundamental protections and enforcement of their treaty rights, would
no longer be as friendly an environment for tribes.
VII. CONCLUSION
The last decade of Indian affairs in this century-1990-2000-reflects a bizarre
blend of a few tribes wielding a powerful degree of economic self-determination and
political activism because of gaming revenues, with most others still languishing in dire
poverty with low educational attainments, high suicide and alcoholism rates, and with
poor health. Even as tribes are exercising political muscle by forming new organizational
alliances with other tribes to protect and enhance their economic base and political status
and are being more active in participating in local, state, and federal elections, they are
confronted by internal and external constraints-from federal and state court rulings,
conservative Congress, a fickle public, and emboldened state governments-which
threaten to derail tribal efforts to become relatively self-sufficient sovereigns, alongside
the states and federal governments.
The subject matter of Indian political participation, or lack thereof, in non-Indian
political affairs is, as we have seen, an extremely complicated set of processes. As a
result of Indian gaming revenues, it promises to be an exceedingly volatile and
unpredictable area because tribes continue to exist as distinctive sovereigns with, in many
cases, fiercely loyal citizens; yet many of these citizens and tribal governments
themselves, are becoming more actively engaged in local, state, and federal political
matters.
How these seemingly contradictory forces will affect the future of
intergovernmental relations is, of course, impossible to predict. What will become of
tribal sovereignty if tribal participatory rates in non-Indian politics continues to increase?
Will federal forces set about to revive the terminationist sentiment of the 1950s and
1960s? How will tribes respond, if this is the case? We simply cannot say at this
moment. Suffice it to say, it is a state of affairs that promises to remain dynamic.
Tribes, organized Indian interest groups, and committed Indian individuals will
continue their efforts to stabilize and improve tribal status by engaging in a variety of
activist approaches as they enter the new millennium. This will include a) being more
active in non-tribal political systems so that their unique needs will be represented; b)
being more selective about bringing lawsuits in state or federal courts because of their
current ideological bent which is not supportive of indigenous treaty rights or trust
obligations; c) continuing their efforts to educate their own people and the American
public and policymakers about their distinctive legal, political, and cultural rights; and d)
working to improve communications and facilitate better relations intertribally and
intergovernmentally.
Such efforts, while not guaranteed to produce success, will be in keeping with the
adaptive and flexible activist tradition that has enabled Indian peoples to sustain
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themselves despite the oppressive odds they have faced throughout history.
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